When marketing takes precedence over security, appearance can end up replacing protection.
Behind the image you are being sold, however, it is your life that is being protected.
Security Does Not Operate in a Vacuum
A security profession is never born in a catalogue. It grows out of an environment: its history, culture, laws, practices, infrastructure and, above all, its particular threats. Those threats are neither identical nor equally likely everywhere in the world. They therefore do not produce the same doctrines, training, equipment or responses.
This may seem obvious. Yet when it comes to close protection, we tend to bring our own frame of reference with us. Someone from a country where convoy travel is commonplace may readily assume that an imposing convoy is the safest response everywhere. Someone accustomed to highly visible institutional protection may consider a discreet arrangement inadequate. Another person, by contrast, may regard that visibility as increased exposure and therefore an additional source of danger.
None of these instincts is absurd: each is simply the product of experience. The mistake begins when personal experience becomes a universal standard. An arrangement that is appropriate in one territory may become cumbersome, ineffective or even counterproductive elsewhere. In a dense city such as Bangkok, for example, increasing the number of vehicles does not necessarily improve either mobility or protection. Sometimes the timetable, routes and programme themselves must be adapted, rather than reproducing a system designed for a different geographical or even social context, as may be the case during national celebrations.
The point is not to set Thailand against France, or one national model against another. I sometimes refer to France because it is the system I know from the inside. It is a personal point of reference, not a yardstick by which to judge the rest of the world.
An International Acronym Does Not Create a Universal Profession
CPO stands for Close Protection Officer. The expression has spread widely because English is the international working language and because the term is simple, recognisable and, let us admit it, commercially effective. A common title, however, guarantees neither an identical status, nor identical training, nor identical powers.
Depending on the country, administration, company or period, one may encounter acronyms such as PHP, TEASS, A3P, APR, GPG, PSA or CPO, as well as a variety of national designations. These terms may refer to professions, functions, qualifications or training modules that sometimes overlap without being interchangeable. Even within a single country, two companies may place very different realities under the title of CPO.
The right question is therefore not, “What do you call this person?” It is, “What training have they received, within what framework, for what mission and with what limitations?” A title is a label. Competence is demonstrated through substance, organisation and results.
SDS–EPSA: Understand the Real Requirement First
Some clients arrive in Thailand without knowing the country. They naturally project onto it the risks they know elsewhere and sometimes imagine an environment more dangerous than it actually is for the mission concerned. They must be reassured without the risks being trivialised. Others understand the level of risk very well and are primarily looking for a reassuring presence, local assistance, an alert capability, translation or a visible representation. Others still face genuine exposure and require a far more restrictive arrangement.
All of these requests may be legitimate, on one condition: they must be described honestly. Representational accompaniment is nothing to be ashamed of. A visible presence intended to enhance a client’s image is not illegitimate. It simply must not be presented as an operational capability that it is not. Appearance may form part of the service; it must never be used as a certificate of competence.
At SDS, the client expresses the requirement and the desired outcome. They describe their activities, movements, constraints and any threat-related information relevant to the assessment, without having to disclose information that is immaterial to the mission. Our responsibility is then to design the protective arrangement. It is not for the client to order “two CPOs, a car and a horse” as though selecting options from a catalogue.
The quotation results from that assessment. It can, of course, be discussed. What we will not do is reduce an arrangement below the level we consider viable simply to make the price artificially acceptable. If the essential conditions are not met, we adapt, postpone or decline the mission. Security is not a commercial promise that one hopes to compensate for later with goodwill.
What We Really Expect from a CPO
In most of the private assignments we encounter in Thailand, a CPO is neither a warrior nor a film character. A CPO is a professional working in direct contact with the VIP. They observe, detect anomalies, understand the local environment, prepare and check movements, coordinate drivers, hotels, sites and other stakeholders, preserve confidentiality and know how to respond to a security or medical incident.
Their value very often lies in what remains unseen: a corrected timetable, a controlled access point, a relocated meeting point, a hotel team alerted in advance, a realistic route with suitable alternatives, medical equipment available, or an anomaly identified before the client arrives. The best incident is still the one that never occurred because it was anticipated.
A CPO must also remain discreet and avoid unnecessarily obstructing the protected person’s activities. Discretion does not, however, mean passivity. In a low-profile arrangement, just as in a more visible one, the professional must be able to recommend changing, postponing or cancelling a movement when the conditions observed no longer match those originally accepted. This operational authority must be established before the mission, not discovered when difficulties arise.
Each Level of Mission Requires the Appropriate Competence
SDS does not present all its personnel as interchangeable. CPOs employed by SDS are trained and monitored by EPSA, SDS’s training department. EPSA is neither an external company nor a separate commercial entity: the service is delivered by SDS, while EPSA provides initial training, continuing development and competency assessment.
Within our organisation, the CPO is the member of staff in direct contact with the VIP. The CPO Team Leader takes responsibility for a team when the mission requires several functions or locations to be covered: advance work, immediate protection, a follow element, or personnel already positioned at a hotel or site. The Defensive Driver remains a CPO, with additional specialist protective-driving skills.
The Site Manager operates at a higher level. They can assess and secure a group of separate sites, as well as the movements between them, arrivals and departures, and the overall coherence of the protective arrangement. They are not necessarily intended to occupy the immediate-protection position themselves; they define the framework within which the Team Leader and the teams execute the mission.
These titles correspond to our internal training and employment programmes. They do not claim to constitute an official universal classification. Their purpose is simply to assign the right competence to the right responsibility. The logic is elementary: the same personnel are not deployed to accompany someone for a few hours and to design an operation spread across several sites.
Two Requests, Two Outcomes
First, a deliberately simplified scenario: a very wealthy international family organises a young woman’s birthday celebration at a luxury hotel in Thailand. The family wants beautiful images and a visible protection presence that also enhances the event. The assessment identifies no particular threat. The mission is nevertheless taken seriously: the young woman is genuinely protected, movements are prepared and an alert capability remains in place. But the desired outcome also includes an image component, understood and accepted by everyone.
Second, another simplified scenario: a professional who is well known in their field and may have attracted some hostility is carrying high-value goods or sensitive documents and must visit several sites. Here, both the objective and the level of constraint change. It may be necessary to secure the accommodation, position personnel nearby, control timings and routes, establish a mission-specific terrain codification (*) understood by the entire team, change a meeting, delay a departure or compartmentalise the circulation of information strictly on a need-to-know basis. Immediate comfort becomes secondary to protecting the person, their property and the purpose of their journey.
(*) Terrain codification: a temporary, mission-specific operational reference system enabling the team to identify locations, routes and decision points without ambiguity.
In both situations, the term “CPO” may appear in the quotation. Yet the mission has neither the same meaning, nor the same architecture, nor the same cost. In both cases, the client must obtain the agreed result—not an improvised performance or a mechanical reproduction of what they are accustomed to seeing in their own country. Every mission is reassessed because, in security, routine is often the first danger.
A Weapon Is Not a Prestige Option
Armed protection must be approached with restraint. When a CPO is armed, the issue is never limited to technical proficiency. It engages the legal framework, authorisations, training, rules governing use, responsibility and the very nature of the threat. A weapon is neither a visual accessory nor automatic proof of a higher level of protection.
An explicit request for an armed officer therefore requires an enhanced assessment. Either it primarily answers a desire for appearance, in which case it must be refused; or it indicates the possibility of a major threat, in which case the client must provide the information required for a serious evaluation. Concealing or minimising a known threat exposes both the protected person and the personnel assigned to accompany them.
Where the law permits and the operational assessment justifies it, an armed capability may be considered, but it must remain exceptional. Where a mission requires powers, resources or a coercive capability beyond ordinary private protection, intervention or support from the competent authorities is often the most responsible answer. A weapon is not an additional option on a quotation: it indicates that the nature of the mission has changed and that coordination with the competent authorities must therefore be considered.
Scoring ten out of ten on a firing range guarantees neither control of a real situation nor the absence of collateral damage.
Self-Induced Danger: The Illusion of Invulnerability
Anonymised account; certain contextual details have been altered. In the early 1990s, in a capital city facing a major terrorist threat, I was protecting a person who drove her own vehicle. The presence of an armed bodyguard had gradually given her a sense of invulnerability. Despite my warnings, her driving became increasingly fast, provocative and dangerous.
Following a road altercation, a vehicle carrying several young people overtook us and then stopped in front of us. At that moment, it was impossible to know whether this was a traffic dispute or a targeted action. I got out, adopted a defensive position and displayed my weapon without firing. The vehicle drove away. The situation ended with some stress, but without harm.
The lesson is not that a weapon solved the problem. It is precisely the opposite. In an ambiguous situation, training and composure prevented recklessness from becoming tragedy. The protected person had herself created part of the danger by believing that my presence made her invulnerable. Protection also means being able to tell a VIP that their behaviour is compromising the mission. And being armed means, first and foremost, knowing when not to fire. We know how it begins; we never know how it will end.
Knowing When to Leave the Spotlight
Over a career spanning more than thirty years, I have directly carried out missions that the international sector now groups under the term CPO, and I have also coordinated complete protective operations—both in highly hostile environments and in places where the protection requested seemed far greater than the actual requirement, or conversely, where the resources committed were insufficient for the threat.
That experience, combined with my years living in Thailand, now allows me to distinguish three things: what is necessary, what is representational or ornamental, and what is simply superfluous. With time, my role is no longer to insist on occupying the position that demands the most immediate physical reaction. I can be more useful in analysis, site reconnaissance, preparation, supervision, training or the transmission of knowledge.
This question is not solely about age. Every security professional must honestly assess their physical, medical, technical and mental abilities, as well as their suitability for the role entrusted to them. A security professional’s first responsibilities include not overestimating themselves. Passing on and sustaining quality is better than remaining in the spotlight until the day one becomes the weak point in the protective arrangement. Stay under the spotlight for too long and, sooner or later, you will step into darkness. A chain is only as strong as its weakest link.
At SDS, We Do Not Sell Snowploughs
Close protection may be discreet, highly visible, highly technical, armed where the law and the threat require it, or include a representational dimension. It may involve one person or a much larger organisation. None of this is inherently ridiculous. Everything depends on the reality of the requirement, the environment, the legal framework and the agreed outcome.
What becomes dangerous is allowing marketing to replace analysis: selling a suit as competence, a weapon as a guarantee, a photograph as operational capability, or an accumulation of resources as an assurance of security.
At SDS, we will not show you our CPOs dressed as intergalactic Terminators for the sake of a photograph. Nor will we attempt to place a snowplough at the head of an escort in Bangkok. Not because a snowplough is a bad vehicle, but because an excellent tool used in an environment where it serves no purpose becomes, at best, useless and, at worst, a liability.
Our profession is not about selling dreams, but about meeting requirements with relevance and precision. It means understanding the threat, assessing the need, stating clearly what can be done, what must not be done and where the limits lie, and finally mobilising the skills and resources genuinely suited to a specific mission, limited in both time and space.
No less, because that would be reckless. No more, because that would be pointless.
Reference Notes
The designations CPO, CPO Team Leader, Defensive Driver and Site Manager described in this article correspond to the internal programmes of SDS and its EPSA training department. Their scope should be understood within that framework.